A central tenet of economics is that agents respond to incentives, yet the real-world effects of performance pay remain a puzzle. Simple models predict a direct increase in effort, while critics warn of a narrow targeted effort. This paper provides new evidence on this debate by studying a statewide bonus program that rewards Advanced Placement (AP) teachers a piece-rate for each student in their class passing the standardized test. We use marginal analysis to show that the bonus induces targeted effort and to explain the mechanisms driving variation in incentive strength, which we test empirically. Using student-course level data linked to teachers and a difference-in-differences design, we first document a significant average effect: the program increased student pass rates by 2.4 percentage points. We then decompose this average effect and report two key insights. First, contrary to the "teaching to the bubble" hypothesis, we find robust evidence of gains concentrated at the top of the AP score distribution. Second, we document heterogeneity across multiple dimensions, suggesting that the success of performance pay is jointly determined by the design of the incentive, the nature of the task, and the agent's baseline performance and workload.

Do policies that broaden educational access also foster success? We study this question in the context of North Carolina’s universal Advanced Placement (AP) exam fee waiver policy, analyzing its effects on the likelihood of exam participation and achieving a passing score (>=3 out of 5). Using administrative data and exploiting within-student variation, we find that fee waivers boost AP exam participation but not the overall pass rate among AP-enrolled students. This, however, masks a robust 3 percentage point increase in the pass rates among low-SES students. We also find imprecise but suggestive evidence of gains among underrepresented minorities (non-Asian and non-White). A complementary analysis, leveraging the full sample of AP courses, shows that fee waivers had the greatest impact in courses where predicted financial barriers were highest, and that the policy's benefits far exceed its cost. Finally, our results help reconcile the seemingly disparate findings from prior work on AP exam funding.

Leveraging Tennessee's 2005 Medicaid contraction, I study the impact of losing public health insurance on body weight and relevant health behaviors. Using Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) data from 1997 to 2010, I estimate synthetic difference-in-differences models. The estimates suggest that the reform increased Body Mass Index by 0.38 points and the overweight or obesity prevalence (BMI>=25) by ~4% among Tennessean childless adults. My findings -- a 21% increase in the share of childless adults reporting ``poor'' health status (the lowest level on the five-point scale), a reduction in Medicaid-reimbursed utilization of pain and anti-inflammatory medications, and a reduction in participation in moderate physical activities -- suggest that worsening unmanaged health conditions may be a key pathway through which coverage loss affected weight gain. Additionally, my analysis offers practical guidance for conducting robust inference in single treated cluster settings with limited pre-treatment data.